Industrial Development and Manufacturing in the Antebellum Gulf South: A Reevaluation

Joshism

Well-Known Member
Joined
Sep 8, 2019
Messages
488
Reaction score
587
Review of Industrial Development and Manufacturing in the Antebellum Gulf South: A Reevaluation by Michael Frawley (LSU Press, 2019):

https://cwba.blogspot.com/2019/09/review-industrial-development-and.html

Per the review, the author's thesis (which looks at Texas, Mississippi, and Alabama - surprisingly not Louisiana) is more industry in the South in 1860 than was previously known, which reveal shortcomings of the 1860 census.

Disclaimer: not my review. This is the first I've heard of the book, but I thought it sounded like an interesting study.
 

jgoodguy

Webmaster
Staff member
Administrator
Joined
May 12, 2019
Messages
7,157
Reaction score
4,171
https://cwba.blogspot.com/2019/09/review-industrial-development-and.html

Yet another author claims to correct all that went before. We have other references that range from slavey was no hindrance to slavery had advantages over free labor in industry.

According to both contemporary northern critics and the works of later scholars, the antebellum American South's agrarian export economy based on slave labor was incompatible with modernizing industrial development. Even many southerners at the time publicly extolled this view, some seeing it as a point of pride. Popular and scholarly traditions together hold that the antebellum South was lacking in every important prerequisite for industrial establishment and growth, namely the availability of locally-sourced raw materials, excess labor for skilled and unskilled factory work, sufficient capital investment, adequate transportation networks, and markets (local or regional) for native-produced goods. A fascinating and highly illuminating study, Michael Frawley's Industrial Development and Manufacturing in the Antebellum Gulf South: A Reevaluationexamines all of these alleged hindrances to modernization in turn and arrives at a series of very different conclusions.

Of course, the South's workforce percentage employed in industry in 1860 was dwarfed by the North's, but Frawley found little evidence to show that worker availability or willingness to toil in factory environments were limiting factors. Even so, just because the South's working population outside of agriculture was adequate for industrial growth does not mean their workers were good at their jobs. However, on that point as well, the book finds that southern workers compared favorably with their northern counterparts. Using one traditional measure of productivity (output per worker), Frawley's calculated Gulf South figures were in line with the national average (just slightly lower), demonstrating that southern whites were willing and entirely able to perform industrial work of all kinds
Other authors suggest that the industrialization started much earlier and then stalled and declined.

No one, including the author, will argue that the industrial capacity of the American South of 1860 had any hope of directly competing with the North's in the coming Civil War, but that's arguably an unfair basis of comparison. Just on manufacturing rankings that use the already demonstrably flawed census data, the states that comprised the Confederacy were already fifth in the world in cotton product manufacturing and eighth in iron production. Thus, though still in its infancy in terms of scale relative to the North, southern industry was already flourishing and regionally integrated by the end of the decade preceding the Civil War. Though much in the way of finished manufactured goods and armaments passed through the blockade, it says something about the South's native manufacturing base that it was able to help the Confederacy stave off the full might of the United States for four full years of industrialized warfare before being ultimately exhausted and overwhelmed. Though still small-scale in absolute terms, Gulf South industry is amply demonstrated through Michael Frawley's formidable corrective to be much more widespread and modern than traditionally supposed. Industrial Development and Manufacturing in the Antebellum Gulf South builds a powerful case that the industrial renaissance commonly presumed to have been a product of the postwar New South actually began much earlier during the 1850s.
At $45 it is targeted at a specialized audience, perhaps a captive audience such as an economics student. At some point I may get lucky and find an ex-library copy.
 

Kirk's Raider's

Well-Known Member
Joined
May 16, 2019
Messages
2,251
Reaction score
922
The Union could easily outproduce enough Ironclads to dominate as the Brown Water Navy.
The Union could not only build it's own blue water Navy but even could export naval war ships.
The Union could expand and maintain its critical railroad infrastructure . The Confederacy failed miserably in this regard.
The Confederacy obviously had the Tredgar Iron Works which just prior to the ACW exported Cannon's to Czarist Russia. The Confederacy could produce artillery fuzes but there were significant safety issues. That's why Confederate troops had to stay behind the artillery. Also good to see @Joshism on board.
Kirk's Raider's
 
Last edited:

jgoodguy

Webmaster
Staff member
Administrator
Joined
May 12, 2019
Messages
7,157
Reaction score
4,171
The Union could easily outproduce enough Ironclads to dominate as the Brown Water Navy.
The Union could not only build it's own blue water Navy but even could export naval war ships.
The Union could expand and maintain its critical railroad infrastructure . The Confederacy failed miserably in this regard.
The Confederacy obviously had the Tredgar Iron Works which just prior to the ACW exported Cannon's to Czarist Russia. The Confederacy could produce artillery fuzes but there were significant safety issues. That's why Confederate troops had to stay behind the artillery. Also good to see @Joshism on board.
Kirk's Raider's
Then again it took 4 years of hard war to put it down.
All the CSA had to do is not lose.
 

Kirk's Raider's

Well-Known Member
Joined
May 16, 2019
Messages
2,251
Reaction score
922
Then again it took 4 years of hard war to put it down.
All the CSA had to do is not lose.
I never bought into the "the Confederacy wins by not loosing school of thought".
First of all the blockade only gets tighter every year and thus less foreign currency gets injected into the Confederacy.
Each year the value of slaves goes down.

Second of all lost territory always means the Union will recruit more Southerners black and white for the Union Army and that really hurts the Confederacy.
Third of all the Confederacy lost territory by 1861 and very rarely such has the recapture of Galveston, Texas and Plymouth,North Carolina could the Confederacy recapture territory.
Conventional warfare is won not by not loosing but by seizing and holding enemy territory.
In Insurgency warfare sometimes one side can loose militarily and still win I.e the Algerian War of Independence 1954 to 1962.
The Confederacy can not protect slavery by guerrilla warfare only by conventional warfare.
The Confederacy had some limited success in manufacturing but that's not good enough to win a war.
Kirk's Raider's
 
Top